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Iran has been the country most affected by the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in the
Middle East. With a relatively high case fatality ratio and limited testing capacity,
the number of confirmed cases reported is suspected to suffer from significant
underreporting. Therefore, understanding the transmission dynamics of COVID-19 and
assessing the effectiveness of the interventions that have taken place in Iran while
accounting for the uncertain level of underreporting is of critical importance. In this paper,
we developed a compartmental transmission model to estimate the time-dependent
effective reproduction number since the beginning of the outbreak in Iran. We associate
the variations in the effective reproduction number with a timeline of interventions and
national events. The estimation method accounts for the underreporting due to low
case ascertainment. Our estimates of the effective reproduction number ranged from
0.66 to 1.73 between February and April 2020, with a median of 1.16. We estimate
a reduction in the effective reproduction number during this period, from 1.73 (95% CI
1.60–1.87) on 1 March 2020 to 0.69 (95% CI 0.68–0.70) on 15 April 2020, due to various
non-pharmaceutical interventions. The series of non-pharmaceutical interventions and
the public compliance that took place in Iran are found to be effective in slowing down the
speed of the spread of COVID-19. However, we argue that if the impact of underreporting
is overlooked, the estimated transmission and control dynamics could mislead public
health decisions, policy makers, and the general public.
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INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in Iran was first officially announced in February 2020, 2 months
after the initial outbreak in Wuhan, China [1]. Iran’s patient zero is believed to have been a
merchant from Qom who had traveled to China [2]. Despite the initial signs of a spread in Qom,
the government declined to place the city under quarantine to contain the epidemic at an early
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stage for various technical, socio-economic, religious, and
security reasons [3]. The first local non-pharmaceutical
interventions, such as school and university closures, were put
in place a few days after the official acknowledgment of the first
cases in Qom and Tehran [4]. Since then, various public health
control measures at the local and national levels were taken
that are believed to have altered the course of the outbreak.
See Figure 1 for a spatial illustration of the spread throughout
the country by province in the first week since the official
announcement of the first case (Supplementary Material).
The relatively high case fatality ratio (CFR), defined as the
total number of deaths over the total number of infected cases,
in Iran’s official reports after the first week since the official
declaration of the first case (16.8%) has raised questions on
the true number of cases in the country [5, 6]. The testing
protocol in Iran at the early stages of the outbreak was limited
to hospital admissions of patients with severe symptoms. While
Iran later extended the COVID-19 diagnostic testing capacity
to patients with milder symptoms, it is believed that the under-
ascertainment of cases remains high. While a number of studies
have already explored the dynamics of the spread of COVID-
19 in different countries with various methodologies [7–10] and
its association with travel restrictions and other public health
interventions [11, 12], undocumented infections and how they
could affect the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in a population has been
a less explored area in the rapidly growing field of COVID-19
literature [13].
This study aims to understand the transmission dynamics of
COVID-19 in Iran and to assess the effectiveness of the control
measures that were put in place over time through estimation of
the effective reproduction number R (t) , defined as the average
number of susceptible persons infected by an infected person
during their infectious period at a given time in the course
of the epidemic. We assessed R(t) in relation to a timeline
of national events and non-pharmaceutical interventions. In
the absence of timely and reliable data, modeling can provide
helpful answers, including the degree of plausible uncertainty in
different estimates and the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical
interventions. By providing explicit and clear information about
FIGURE 1 | Spatial illustration of the spread of COVID-19 in Iran by province in the first week of the official outbreak announcement from 19 February to 25 February
2020 (A–D).
model assumptions and parameters, modeling can also foster
scientific discussion of data gaps and what can be done to
improve outbreak-related estimates by borrowing information
available elsewhere. Finally, models can be developed and
presented using both average estimates and measures of their
uncertainty or, alternatively, as scenarios that can illustrate
possible developments of the epidemic under various conditions.
METHODS
Data Sources
We use official time-series reports of the number of confirmed
cases, recovered cases, and deaths from the World Health
Organization (WHO) [1] and Iran’s Ministry of Health and
Medical Education [14]. The first confirmed case was reported
on 19 February 2020, which is assumed as the beginning of the
outbreak of COVID-19 in Iran.
Mathematical Model
We describe the dynamics of spread using a variation
of the susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR) model,
distinguishing between fatal and recovered cases combined
with an estimate of the percentage of symptomatic cases using
delay-adjusted CFR (Supplementary Material) (see Figure 2).
The model accounts for the time between exposure-to-onset
of symptoms (or confirmation), also known as an incubation
period, assuming a gamma distribution with an average of 5.5
days and a standard deviation of 2.3 days [15]. We also assume
the time from symptoms onset-to-death and -to-recovery both
follow a gamma distribution with an average of 22.3 days and a
standard deviation of 9.4 days, and an average of 22.2 days and
a standard deviation of 10 days, respectively [16]. The size of the
initial susceptible population is assumed to be 80 million.
Time-Dependent Effective Reproduction
Number
The basic reproduction number, R0, a fundamental measure in
infectious disease epidemiology and public health, is defined as
the average number of susceptible persons infected by an infected
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of the formulated mathematical epidemic model.
person during their infectious period in a fully susceptible
population. R0 is known to fluctuate if the social contact rate in
the population changes over time or space. Since R0 assumes an
entirely susceptible population, several studies from the literature
[17, 18] suggest using the time-dependent effective reproduction
number R(t) when examining the effect of various interventions
including vaccination, social distancing, and quarantine. R(t) is
defined similarly to R0 but is not limited to the assumption of a
completely susceptible population. Here, we use empirical data
from Iran to trace changes in R(t) over a rolling 7-day period
since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak and describe
its association with various interventions (e.g., school closures,
social distancing, and bans on public gatherings) that were
enacted by the public and government.
Various methods exist to estimate R0 [and R(t)] [19–21]. Here,
we use the same framework described in Figure 2 in which the
parameters of the formulated SEIR model are inferred through
an optimization problem. To estimate the parameters of the
developed SEIR model, we formulate an ordinary least squares
(OLS) minimization [22]. We use pattern search as a derivative-
free global optimization algorithm [23] to find the model
parameters that minimizes the sum of the normalized root mean
squared error (RMSE) of the number of infected εi, recovered
εr, and removed cases εf . R(t) is then calculated using a rolling
time window of 7 days to capture the evolving trend of the spread
over time due to various changes in the social network contact
rate. The calculated R(t) may be overestimated during the early
stage of an outbreak [24] due to different reasons, including the
impact of imported cases and heterogeneity in subpopulations
(e.g., older than 60 years old) with higher transmission rates.
Accounting for Underreporting
We account for the underreporting of the number of infected
cases in the official confirmed data using delay-adjusted case
fatality ratio (CFR) approach [25]. This approach assumes that
the time from hospitalization-to-death has a known statistical
distribution and uses this distribution to estimate when the
people who died from COVID-19 would have been reported
as being infected (Supplementary Material). The case fatality
ratio is the ratio of the numbers of deaths over the numbers
of reported infections calculated at the time of reporting, not
the time of death. This is extremely important for rapidly
evolving epidemics. The method, however, does not account
for underreporting in fatality cases. The distribution of the
time from confirmation-to-death is assumed to follow the
same distribution as of the time from hospitalization-to-death,
following a lognormal distribution with a mean of 13 days
and a standard deviation of 12.7 days [26]. Here, we assume
that the estimate for percentage of symptomatic COVID-19
cases reported for Iran follows a lognormal distribution (same
distribution type as of the time from hospitalization-to-death)
with a mean of 9.9% and a standard deviation of 4% based
on the latest estimates in the literature [25]. This is based on
the assumption of a baseline CFR of 1.4%. We assume the
underreporting level remains constant over time.
Model Limitations
The developed model does not take into account the imported
cases. The model also does not capture the impact of quarantine
and self-isolation on confirmed cases. While the model produces
stochastic outcomes due to various delay distributions used as
inputs, the model parameters are deterministic. The model does
not take into account the population age distribution. It is also
assumed that underreporting remains unchanged over time.
RESULTS
We estimated that R(t) varied between 1.73 and 0.69 during
March to April 2020 in Iran, with a median of 1.16. We estimated
a reduction in R(t) from early-March to mid-April, from 1.35
(95% CI 1.31–1.39) on 8 March 2020 to 0.69 (95% 0.68–0.70)
on 15 April 2020, due to control measures that took place.
See Figure 3A for a timeline of interventions and events and
Figure 3B for temporal variations of estimated R(t).
The CFR on 25 February 2020, before adjusting for the time
from diagnosis-to-death, was 16.84%. With more data emerging
after the second week, the CFR dropped to 4.4% on the 14th
day since the declared beginning of the outbreak on February
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FIGURE 3 | Temporal evolution of SARS-CoV-2 transmission characteristics in Iran. (A) Timeline of events and interventions that took place since the first case was
reported on 19 February 2020. (B) Estimated effective reproduction number R(t) with 95% CI over a 7-day rolling window when underreporting is taken into account.
(C) Estimated CFR with and without delay adjustment over the same time period in a semi-log scale.
19, 2020. Later, between 15 March 2020 and 12 April 2020,
the CFR stabilized between 5.2 and 7.8% with a mean of 6.7%
(see Figure 3C). With the wider spread of COVID-19 across the
country, the CFR increased to 7.86% on 23March 2020. However,
the CFR declined and plateaued around 6.2% between 1 and
15 April 2020. The relatively high CFR could correspond to a
significant level of underreporting of the infected cases and an
overwhelmed health system. Given the wide distribution of the
time from confirmation-to-death of COVID-19, we also explore
the delay-adjusted CFR with 5- and 10-day delay periods, as
examples. The dynamics of the delay-adjusted CFR with a 10-day
delay suggests that the CFR has been gradually reducing in Iran
from 17.97% on 16 March 2020 to 8.20% on 12 April 2020.
When underreporting of infected cases is overlooked, the
estimated effective reproduction number began from 5.67 (95%
CI 5.48–4.86) on 1 March 2020 and reduced to 0.70 (95% CI
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FIGURE 4 | The impact of underreporting on the estimated dynamics of transmission. (A,B) The projected curves for the number of infected cases when
underreporting is not considered and when it is taken into account, respectively. (C) Temporal variations of R(t) when underreporting is overlooked (purple curve) and
when it is taken into account (green curve).
0.69–0.71) on 15 April 2020, suggesting the outbreak peak has
already occurred on 8 April 2020 when R(t) goes below 1, about
50 days from the confirmation of the first case. The outbreak is
also likely to continue until the end of 2020 (see Figure 4). The
estimates of the effective reproduction number were consistently
larger during the early stage of the outbreak when underreporting
is overlooked compared to when underreporting is taken into
account. However, the estimated effective reproduction numbers
converged as the number of infected cases approached the peak.
The convergence of the estimates can be partly explained by the
fact that the effective reproduction number is more dependent
on the rate of change in the infected and recovered cases rather
than their absolute numbers. Results also suggest that the impact
of control measures on the effective reproduction number is
significantly overestimated when underreporting is not taken
into account.
With the gradual reduction of the effective reproduction
number to below one and the increasing pressure on an
already fragile economy because of the implemented control
measures, the government is seeking an exit strategy and is
considering easing some of the restrictions. Here, we conduct
a scenario analysis to understand how three different scenarios
could change the projected outlook of the outbreak in Iran:
(i) maintaining the same level of control measures as of 12
April 2020; (ii) intensifying the measures to increase physical
distancing, represented by a 20% reduction in the reproduction
number; and (iii) partially lifting the restrictions to ease physical
distancing, represented by a 20% increase in the reproduction
number (see Figure 5). To estimate the number of ICU beds
needed, we assume 5% of confirmed cases require intensive care
[27]. We found that in all scenarios the projection of patients
requiring ICU admission exceeds the original ICU capacity. Note
that no official information is available on the expanded ICU
capacity. As of 12 April 2020, both projected curves start above
the ICU capacity. Easing the restrictions can quickly push the
peak to a level that is five times higher than the scenario where
the current level of control measures is maintained and puts
additional pressure on the health system. Results clearly suggest
that with further restrictions (scenario ii), the projected curve
quickly goes back under the ICU capacity, while it takes more
than 100 days for the curve to go back under the ICU capacity in
scenario i and iii.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we used a mathematical epidemic model to
provide the first estimates of the changing transmission of SARS-
CoV-2 infection in Iran when the underreporting of cases is
considered. We used official data and adjusted our estimates for
underreporting based on delay-adjusted CFR.
We used a variation of the SEIR model combined with an
estimate of the percentage of symptomatic cases using delay-
adjusted CFR based on the distribution of the time from
confirmation-to-death [19]. In contrast to previous models of
the epidemic [28], we did not assume any prior information
on the distribution of the effective reproduction number. This,
combined with the use of a series of distributions, allowed us
to take into account more appropriately the uncertainty and the
random variation in both input data and model outcomes.
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FIGURE 5 | Scenario analysis for maintaining, reinforcing, or easing the restrictions. (A) The projected curves for the total number of confirmed and suspected cases
under three different scenarios: maintaining the same level of control measures as of 12 April 2020, reinforcing the control measures to increase physical distancing by
a 20% increase in the reproduction number, and partial lifting the restrictions to ease physical distancing by a 20% decrease in the reproduction number. (B) The
projected number of ICU beds needed under the three scenarios. The original ICU capacity is assumed between 3,500 to 7,000 beds [7].
Association of R(t) and Public Health
Interventions
The outbreak of COVID-19 in Iran is claimed to have started
in Qom province, with the first case officially reported on 19
February 2020. As shown earlier in Figure 1A, according to the
official data, it only took 2 days for four more provinces, Tehran,
Markazi, Mazandaran, and Gilan (Guilan), to report their first
cases. The first non-pharmaceutical intervention took place on
22 February 2020, with the closure of schools and universities in
Qom, followed by their closure in the capital city of Tehran after
a day. With the school closures in the capital combined with low
levels of social awareness about the potential risks of COVID-19,
a surge in the number of holiday trips from Tehran to northern
provinces of Mazandaran and Gilan was observed. Soon after,
with no restriction on inter-city travel, the number of identified
cases in Gilan and Mazandaran grew rapidly, and the infection
spread throughout the rest of the country.
The second major non-pharmaceutical intervention occurred
on 28 February 2020 with a wide campaign to disinfect public
spaces and for the closure of all schools and universities across
all provinces. On 5 March 2020, the government announced an
increase in the COVID-19 testing capacity. On 7 March 2020,
sporadic closure or reduction of working hours in government
offices and banks across the country was reported. On 14
March 2020, two often crowded religious shrines in Qom
and Mashhad were closed to visitors. The increased physical
distancing as the result of interventions and increase in public
awareness of the crisis through major official and unofficial
information campaigns, especially on social media, gradually
showed its impact by slowing down the speed of the spread, as
shown earlier in Figure 1B. The estimated effective reproduction
number increased from 1.14 on 4 March 2020 to 1.35 on 8
March 2020, perhaps due to the increase in case ascertainment
and delay in early interventions to show their impact. The
effective reproduction number decreased consistently to 1.04 on
20 March 2020.
On 17 March 2020, only a few days before the Persian
New Year (Nowruz, 20 March 2020), in the absence of
strict travel restrictions, millions of Iranians began making
road trips to various destinations across the country,
despite the warnings from the government, and many
hotels, restaurants, and the general hospitality industry’s
refrainment to provide services to any traveler. This is believed
to have increased the speed of the spread of COVID-19
in Iran, increasing the effective reproduction number to
1.52 on 30 March 2020.
On 22 March 2020, the government announced more
restrictive non-pharmaceutical interventions, leading to the
closure of all non-essential businesses for at least 2 weeks,
followed by further intensified interventions on March 28, 2020,
including restrictions on entry and exit to affected provinces and
cities, closure of parks, pools, and all recreational places, and a
ban on public gatherings including sport, cultural, and religious
events. These restrictions pushed the effective reproduction
number further down to 1.0 on 9 April 2020 and 0.69 on 15
April 2020.
Case Fatality Ratio
Iran has had one of the highest CFRs among the affected
countries in the world. While the CFR is known to vary
significantly between countries due to various reasons, including
testing frequency and population age distribution [26], the CFR
is still higher in Iran despite having a younger population with
a median age of 30.8 years old compared to China with 4%
CFR and a median population age of 37.4 and South Korea with
2% CFR and a median population age of 41.8 [26]. Perhaps a
comparable country in the Middle East with similar population
characteristics (median age of 30.9) is Turkey. The CFR in Turkey
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as of 6 April 2020 was 2%, three times lower than that of Iran
[26]. While the evidence is indirect, it suggests that the official
number of cases reported by Iran may have been significantly
underreported, possibly due to relatively low case-ascertainment
and underreporting of identified cases [26].
The continuous reduction in the delay-adjusted CFR shows a
different trend compared to the CFR with no consideration of
the time from confirmation-to-death. The continuous reduction
could be explained by the improving case identification practice
in Iran over time with various initiatives, including a National
Coronavirus Helpline (a.k.a the “4030” service), established
in late February 2020 to self-report symptoms and identify
suspected cases.
Our results confirmed the significant impact of
underreporting in describing the story of the COVID-19
outbreak in Iran, especially in the early stages. We showed how
overlooking underreporting can drastically affect the estimation
of R(t) and overestimate the impact of control measures.
Final Remarks
Our results showed the reduction in effective reproduction
number, a measure of infection transmission, during the study
period. This decrease was most likely due to increased physical
distancing as the result of multiple non-pharmaceutical public
health interventions, including school closures, bans on public
gatherings, travel restrictions, and full/partial closure of non-
essential businesses, as well as major awareness campaigns
over social media. Based on the latest trends, while the
first peak of COVID-19 in Iran occurred on 5 April 2020,
the post-peak period may continue to the end of 2020.
However, these projections assume the continuation of the
current level of control measures and the absence of effective
therapeutic treatments or vaccination programs. Hence, they
can be subject to important shifts depending, in particular,
on the public’s willingness to continue and the government’s
success in implementing social distancing measures or easing
the restrictions.
Our model provides tangible evidence of the association
between the different non-pharmaceutical interventions and
their impact on the course of the outbreak. The results
showed how the acceptance and, hence, effectiveness of the
interventions endorsed by the Iranian government aimed at
“flattening the curve” depended in part on the public’s level
of awareness of the principles behind governmental policies
and their trust in the government and its control measures.
For example, closure of schools and businesses in the capital
city of Tehran near the time of the Persian New Year was
followed by a surge in holiday trips to Gilan and Mazandaran
and a subsequent increase in the number of cases in these
provinces and in other parts of the country. This observation
shows how interventions may be associated with unintended
and at times counterproductive consequences. These negative
consequences can be prevented when there is open and credible
communication by competent officials and mutual trust between
the public and government. Moreover, intervention measures
need to be developed, implemented, and enforced as a whole,
for example through strict reinforcement of travel restrictions in
conjunction with school and workplace closings.
There is no substitute for high quality data—complete,
accurate, and timely—as a basis for public policy. However, in
the absence of such data, modeling of the type presented here
can help provide reasonable estimates as well as realistic bounds
of their uncertainty. The range of uncertainty can be viewed as
the margin of error in the model’s predictions of the number of
cases, ICU admissions, or deaths. Modeling can also illustrate
different scenarios – pessimistic vs. optimistic vs. realistic – of
how the epidemic may evolve in relation to current and future
public health measures and the possible compliance of the public
over time.
In conclusion, using a compartmental model of the SARS-
CoV-2 epidemic in Iran, we assessed the dynamic of the epidemic
in relation to public healthmeasures to increase social distancing.
We took into account both the inherent uncertainty in the
data and the possible impact of underreporting of true cases
due to low case ascertainment and reporting. In the absence of
consistently reliable data, the modeling approach as presented
here can help to generate reasonable estimates of key public
health metrics, such as the number of cases and case fatality
ratio. In turn, these metrics and scenarios can help serve the
dual purpose of informing public policy and the public, and of
fostering discussions and improvements of epidemic modeling.
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